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This paper documents how the structure of extended family networks in rural Mexico relates 
to the poverty and inequality of the village of residence. Using the Hispanic naming 
convention, we construct within-village extended family networks in 504 poor rural villages. 
Family networks are larger (both in the number of members and as a share of the village 
population) and out-migration is lower the poorer and the less unequal the village of 
residence. Our results are consistent with the extended family being a source of informal 
insurance to its members. 
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our own. 1 Introduction
Village economies in developing countries are characterized by missing or imperfect formal credit
and insurance markets. Yet, there is a high need for insurance, caused by large income ﬂuctuations
and by limited income diversiﬁcation. In this context, informal institutions emerge as resource-
sharing devices. The extended family, that is, the set of related households living in the same
village, might be one such institution.
There are good reasons to focus on extended family networks as an important informal in-
stitution. First, evolutionary biology suggests preferences are deﬁned over the family dynasty.
Second, there are speciﬁc inter-generational investments — such as those into children’s education,
bequests, and the choice of marriage partners — that have no counterpart in relationships between
friends, and provide long run incentives for family members to reciprocate in implicit contrac-
tual arrangements. Third, the costs of transacting within the family network are likely low if its
members have easy access to information about their relatives and possess mechanisms to punish
relatives that renege on agreements [La Ferrara, 2003].
There is a large literature on risk sharing in developing countries. This literature shows that
the village as a whole typically does not reach a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of resources [Townsend
1994, Ligon 1998, Dercon and Krishnan 2000]. At the same time, there is stronger evidence of
eﬃcient risk-sharing within ethnic groups [Deaton 1992, Udry 1994], sub-castes [Mazzocco and
Saini 2005, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005], and family and friends [Rosenzweig 1988, Fafchamps
and Lund 2003, La Ferrara 2003, Cox and Fafchamps 2007, Fafchamps 2008]. There is also
evidence that interpersonal loans, transfers, and labor exchange arrangements occur primarily
within long-standing interpersonal networks such as the extended family [Ellsworth 1985, Lucas
and Stark 1985, Krishnan and Sciubba 2004]. Extended families aﬀect also their members’ inter-
generational transfers [Cox and Jakubson 1995, Altonji et al 1997, La Ferrara 2003, Behrman
and Rosenzweig 2006] and their children’s education [Weiss and Willis 1985, Loury 2006]. The
transfers between relatives may be crowded out by public transfers [Albarran and Attanasio 2003,
Cox and Fafchamps 2007].
In this paper we explore the relationship between the structure of extended family networks
and the characteristics of the local village economy. There are good reasons to believe such factors
should be empirically correlated, and these are driven by the ability of households to more easily
share resources with others they are related to, than with other households all else equal.
In particular, on one hand the need for resource-sharing is greater in poorer or more marginal
villages. In more marginal villages, that might be so deﬁned because they are geographically
remote, we expect there to be larger networks, or more dense networks, because the costs of
forming links outside the village is higher. This might be exacerbated because informal contracts
are more diﬃcult to fulﬁl when income is very low and hence the extended family acts as an
eﬀective contract enforcement institution [Coate and Ravallion 1993].1
1Gertler et al [2006] provide one important counter example to this — using data from Indonesia they ﬁnd that
2On the other hand, the establishment of resource sharing family networks may help to smooth
consumption and increase investment, hence endogenously improving the wealth in the village
economy. If this eﬀect dominates overall, we expect to observe larger and denser family networks
in less marginal villages.
There are also mechanisms relating village level inequality and family network structures. For
example, the gains from informal risk sharing increase as the incomes of the sharing group become
less correlated. The level of village inequality may be generated by diﬀerent income proﬁles of the
households, and could be correlated with diﬀerential sources of risk. On the one hand, this implies
family networks should not be geographically concentrated, as they will then be more likely to be
subject to common risks, i.e. weather or pests. It is therefore possible that risk is smoothed across
villages through the strategic choice of marriage partners for children, and in particular daughters
[Rosenzweig and Stark 1989], and out-migration [Winters et al 2001, Davis et al 2002, Munshi
2003, Angelucci 2006].2
On the other hand, as the geographic dispersion between network members increases, the
transactions costs of maintaining interpersonal links, monitoring the behavior of others in the
network, and providing non-monetary transfers such as labor exchange, also increase. In addition,
as the likelihood of out-migration for a given individual increases, this may reduce the likelihood
that other individuals will want to enter cooperative arrangements with them [Schiﬀ 2002]. Lastly,
credit constraints may limit out-migration from poorer villages.
Even if individuals were to never move across villages, marriage markets provide another
important mechanism through which village inequality and family network structures in the same
village relate to each other. If matching in the marriage market is assortative in terms of family
resources, inequality leads to less integrated villages as households marry within wealth classes.
Inequality within villages then becomes self perpetuating as family networks do not integrate with
each other over time [Kremer 1997, Fernández et al 2005, Ermisch et al 2006].3
To summarize, there are many mechanisms through which the marginality of the village econ-
omy and inequality within it, relate to the family network structures that are observed within the
village. The theoretical predictions on how these factors interplay with each other are neither well
established empirically, nor clear cut theoretically. This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to document these
relationships and establish which eﬀects dominate overall. We view this as the starting point of a
the presence of family ties, or other forms of social capital, has little eﬀect on the ability of households to insure
consumption against one-oﬀ health shocks.
2In developed countries, Bentolila and Ichino [2006] provide evidence from four OECD countries consistent
with the view that family support and the Welfare State substitute each other in mitigating the consequences of
unemployment shocks. Alesina and Giuliano [2007], using data from 70 countries in the World Value Survey, show
that strong family ties imply more reliance on the family as a provider of goods and services, and less reliance on
the market and on the government for social insurance.
3In addition, to the extent that village inequality generates distinct group identities, this can aﬀect the accumu-
lation of social capital and provision of local public goods [La Ferrara 2003]. Theoretically, the eﬀect of inequality
on public goods provision is again ambiguous and depends on the characteristics of the public good [Olson 1965,
Bardhan et al 2002, Banerjee et al 2001]. Again this can aﬀect the demand for extended family members to remain
co-located in the same village in order to provide public goods to each other.
3broader research agenda.
We provide evidence from rural Mexico on how the village level of development and inequality
relate to the structure of extended family networks in terms of size and characteristics of the links.
Our two key variables are: (i) an index of the development or marginality of the village designed
by the Mexican federal government; (ii) an index of household’s permanent income, from which we
construct the Gini coeﬃcient for each village. This coeﬃcient proxies the extent of within-village
inequality in the distribution of income, assets, and land. These two indices capture long run
features of the economic environment in each village.
We use household data from the evaluation of Progresa, a social assistance program in rural
Mexico. These data have two key features that make them ideal for the purposes of this project.
First, the data are a census of 504 villages and therefore provide information on all their residents.
Second, they contain people’s last names. We combine information on the paternal and maternal
surnames of heads of households and their spouses with the dual-surname convention in Mexico
to obtain a complete mapping of the within-village extended family networks, covering around
22,000 households and over 130,000 individuals.4
We consider two types of relatives: related households from diﬀerent generations, which we
call inter-generational links, such as those from the head and spouse to their parents, and to their
adult sons and daughters; related households from the same generation, labelled intra-generational
links, such as those from the head and spouse to their brothers and sisters.
We present three main ﬁndings. First, as conjectured, poorer villages have larger family net-
works both in terms of number of households embedded and as a share of total village population.
These ﬁndings are consistent with insurance motives driving the formation of family networks.
All else equal, a larger network is better able to smooth away idiosyncratic shocks, and therefore
produce a higher level (possibly full) of risk sharing.
Second, we document that both intra and inter-generational ties from households are more
likely to remain co-resident within the same village, the poorer and the more equal the village.
This applies equally to the blood relatives of the head of household and their spouse. Hence all
households within the family network — irrespective of how they are related — appear to be part
of informal insurance arrangements.
Finally, we provide evidence that decisions over household’s permanent location choices are
correlated with the underlying features of the village economy in which their extended family
reside. In particular, permanent out-migration is more likely to occur from more unequal villages.
One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that family networks are less important when there
is enough idiosyncratic income variation within a village. In this case migrants might provide
insurance against village level shocks. This is further supported by evidence that these migrants
do indeed send remittances back to their extended family. On the other hand, temporary migration
does not appear to be correlated with village inequality.
Overall, the results support the notion that in poorer and more equal villages, the beneﬁts of
4In a similar spirit, Guell et al [2007] use surnames in Spain to document patterns of intergenerational mobility.
4geographically dispersed family networks — such as being subject to diﬀerent weather related risks
— do not oﬀset the costs of the network being dispersed — such as increased transactions costs of
enforcing cooperative agreements within the network.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the design and evaluation of policy interven-
tions. For example, targeting the poorest villages implies targeting mainly households that are
part of an extended family. The few households with no extended family in the village may be
less likely to beneﬁt from such interventions.
When evaluating such targeted interventions and thinking through the likely consequences
of scaling up, our results suggest two factors need to be borne in mind. On the one hand, if
there are complementarities between the way in which policy interventions are designed and the
presence of the extended family, then any measured behavioral responses to the policy needs to
be decomposed into that attributable to the policy itself and that due to the presence of the
extended family. Without such an analysis, the expected program eﬀects as the policy expands
to less marginal villages are likely to be overestimated because in those locations family networks
are less dense. On the other hand, if transfers take place within extended families, then policy
responses may be muted in the most marginal villages where any transfers are shared within the
extended family. Ignoring such eﬀects would lead to underestimating the true policy eﬀects as the
program expands to less marginal locations.
A natural question that arises from this analysis is whether, ultimately, the presence of extended
family members inﬂuences household behavior and outcomes. Indeed we see this paper as part of
a broader research agenda building on previous work on consumption [Altonji et al 1992], inter-
generational transfers [Cox and Jakubson 1995, Altonji et al 1997, La Ferrara 2003, Behrman and
Rosenzweig 2006], and children’s education choices [Loury 2006]. For example, Angelucci et al
[2007] show that, when households are oﬀered a 66% subsidy to send their children to secondary
school, only households that are part of a connected family, hence able to pool resources, increase
school attendance. Households eligible for this partial subsidy, but without relatives in the village,
do not increase secondary school enrollment.
2 Data
2.1 The Progresa Evaluation Data
We use household data collected to evaluate the Progresa social assistance program in rural Mexico.
The data are a census of 504 villages, whose 24,000 households are interviewed every six months
between October 1997 and November 1999.5 The data we use are collected in November 1998,
about 6 months after the beginning of the program, or before its start. In this way, none of our
key variables are likely inﬂuenced by the presence of the program, which was initially oﬀered only
5The villages are located in seven states — Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi,
and Veracruz — and are mainly located in central Mexico.
5in a random subset of villages.
Villages were selected on the basis of a village marginality index constructed in 1995 from
information on — (i) the share of illiterate adults in the village; (ii) the share of dwellings without
water, drainage systems, electricity, and with ﬂoors of dirt; (iii) the average number of occupants
per room in households; (iv) the share of the population working in the primary/agricultural sector;
(v) health and school infrastructures present in the village; (vi) distances from other villages. The
index is deﬁned so that it increases as the village becomes more marginal or worse oﬀ. In order
to more easily interpret the eﬀect of village marginality on family networks, we standardize the
marginality index across all villages so that it has mean zero and standard deviation one.6
The village marginality index provides a summary statistic characterizing average levels of
poverty within the village, the vulnerability of the population to income shocks, and the integration
of the village economy into local markets and the wider economy. All these channels will inﬂuence
the location choices of households and therefore the structure of extended family networks that
reside in any given village, as has long been argued by demographers [Taylor et al 1996]. We use
this index as a measure of village long-term poverty. From now on we will use village poverty and
marginality interchangeably.
To determine a household’s entitlement to Progresa transfers, in 1997 households were classiﬁed
as either being eligible (poor) or non-eligible (non-poor) according to a household welfare index.
This index is calculated as a weighted average of — (i) household income (excluding children); (ii)
household size; (ii) ownership of durables, land, and livestock; (iv) educational attainment; (v)
physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index gives relatively greater weight to the correlates
of permanent, rather than current, income. The household welfare index, on which the village
inequality index is based, is deﬁned for each of the seven regions in the Progresa data. We therefore
control for permanent diﬀerences across regions throughout the empirical analysis.
We use this household welfare index to construct a measure of inequality at the village level
— deﬁned to be the Gini coeﬃcient of the welfare index across all households in the village.
This summary statistics captures inequality in income, acquired human capital, assets, and land
holdings, across a census of households in the village. Again, this captures a number of channels
through which the location choices of households are inﬂuenced, such as the need for and ability
of family members to insure each other.7
Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of these two indices. By construction, the
village marginality index has mean zero and standard deviation one. The Gini coeﬃcient is, on
average, 8.34. This is considerably lower than measures of the Gini coeﬃcient for most developing
countries as a whole, which are typically based on household’s current income. This is to be
expected given the coeﬃcient here is — (i) based both on a measure of household’s permanent
6The marginality index is normalized by region (because poverty lines diﬀer by region) and because the number
of villages diﬀers by region, the mean of the index is not identically equal to zero.
7The Gini coeﬃcient satisﬁes four desirable properties of any measure of inequality — the anonymity principle,
the population principle, the relative income principle, and the Dalton principle. Ray [1998] provides a detailed
discussion of these properties, and a comparison of the Gini coeﬃcient with alternative measures of inequality.
6income and so is less likely to reﬂect transitory shocks to income or wealth; (ii) reﬂects only
within village, and not across village, inequality.
Table 1 also presents information on the average village size, as deﬁned by the number of
households in the village. The sampled villages are relatively small so that family networks may
be especially important determinants of household behavior and outcomes in this setting.
Figure 1A shows a scatter plot of the village marginality and inequality indices. The two are not
much correlated — the correlation coeﬃcient between the two is -.043. This helps us to separately
identify the relationship between each index and the structure and composition of extended family
networks. Figure 1B shows the two measures of the village economy are not much related to village
size. The correlation in the village marginality (inequality) index and village size is -.151 (.009).
In some cases, this ﬁnding eases concerns that we spuriously attribute any mechanical correlation
between village size and networks to these features of the economic environment.8
2.2 Constructing Extended Family Links
We map the relations between households in the same village matching surnames, which are pro-
vided in the third wave of data. Mexicans use two surnames — the ﬁrst is inherited from the father’s
paternal lineage and the second from the mother’s paternal lineage. For example, former Mexican
president Vicente Fox Quesada would be identiﬁed by his given name (Vicente), his father’s pater-
nal name (Fox) and his mother’s paternal name (Quesada). In the evaluation data, respondents
were asked to provide the — (i) given name; (ii) paternal surname; and, (iii) maternal surname,
for each household member. Hence couple-headed households have four associated surnames —
the paternal and maternal surnames of the head, and the paternal and maternal surnames of his
wife.9
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the matching algorithm. To deﬁne each family link, we use
information on two of the four surnames. Consider household A at the root of the family tree.
The head of the household has paternal and maternal surnames F1 and f1 respectively. His wife
has paternal and maternal surnames F2 and f2 respectively.10
8If however the indices have a causal eﬀect on networks and village size also aﬀects networks and these two
eﬀects oﬀset each other, then the low correlation between the indices and village size is not as suggestive.
9The precise wording of the question in Spanish is, “Dígame por favor el nombre completo con todo y apellidos
de todas las personas que viven en este hogar, empezando por (jefe del hogar) — (i) nombre; (ii) apellido paterno;
(iii) apellido materno”. We cleaned the surnames data as follows — (i) we removed non-alphabetical characters,
replaced “Sin Apellido” (no surname) with missing values, and corrected some obvious typos based on intra-
household surname checks; (ii) we imputed a small number of missing female surnames from wave 2; (iii) we
veriﬁed surnames using the same information from wave 5, and veriﬁed the relationship to the household head
using wave 1 data. No information on surnames is available in the ﬁrst wave of data. The head of household is
originally deﬁned to be the main income earner. In a very small number of cases the head of a couple headed
household is reported to be a women. To keep the exposition clear, we redeﬁne the head to be male in such cases.
10We use the convention that the head’s surnames are written in black, and those of his wife are written in red
italics. Paternal surnames are indicated in upper case and maternal surnames are indicated in lower case. First
names are not shown as they are not relevant for the construction of extended family links. Each household in the
family tree is assumed to be couple headed purely to ease the exposition. In Anglo Saxon countries, F1 corresponds
to the family name and F2 corresponds to the spouse’s maiden name.
7The children of the couple in household A will adopt the paternal surnames of their father (F1)
and mother (F2). Hence we deﬁne there to be a parent-son relationship between households A
and B if — (i) the paternal surname of the head in household B is the same as the paternal surname
of the head in household A (F1); and, (ii) the maternal surname of the head in household B is the
same as the paternal surname of the spouse in household A (F2). Parent-daughter relationships
can be similarly deﬁned. Moreover, intra-generational family ties between siblings can also be
identiﬁed. For example, the heads of households B and C are identiﬁed to be brothers if they
share the same paternal and maternal surnames.
In Figure 2 we assume households are couple headed solely to ease the exposition. To deal
with the 15% of households that are single headed we use information on the gender of the head
to accurately deﬁne each family link. Finally, we impose the following restrictions when deﬁning
family links — (i) inter-generational links exist when the relevant individuals have at least 15
years age diﬀerence, and no more than 60 years age diﬀerence between mother and child; (ii)
intra-generational links exist when the individuals have at most 30 years age diﬀerence.11
In presenting descriptive evidence on extended family networks as a whole, we use information
from both single- and couple-headed households that are surveyed in the ﬁrst and third waves
of the data. For the later econometric analysis we restrict attention to the 18,979 couple-headed
households, as this allows us to compare the extended family links of heads and their spouses.
In the Appendix we discuss the forms of potential measurement error that can occur using our
matching algorithm and provide evidence on the likely prevalence of these errors. With these
caveats in mind, it is important to reiterate that all links are deﬁned across households on the
basis of two surname matches and the fact that these two surnames map precisely to two of the
four surname types. For the empirical analysis, we only exploit information on whether such
family links exist, and not the number of links.
One concern is that extended family networks might be formed through assortative matching
and inheritance, and this might inﬂuence the measure of village inequality. In the Appendix we
provide more detailed descriptive evidence on the distribution of surnames in villages. We later
present evidence on the distribution of wealth within family networks.12
11There are of course limits to which information on surnames can be used to construct family ties. Consider
links from household i to a single headed household j. As Figure 1 shows, the fact that household j is single headed
does not aﬀect the construction of links from the head and spouse of household i either to their children or to
their siblings. However, links from the head (spouse) of household i to the household of his (her) parents can only
be identiﬁed if both his (her) parents are alive and resident together. This is because this particular family link
is identiﬁed using information from household j on the paternal surnames of both the head and spouse. However
this is unlikely to be a major issue in practice. For example we note that female widows aged above 40 are 37%
more likely to live as a dependent within a household, rather than head their own household, relative to a similar
married woman. These single parents are then recorded in the household roster. The fact that most unmarried
elderly women in Mexico reside with kin is documented in the demography literature [De Vos 2002].
12See Guell et al [2007] for more evidence and tests of assortative matching by surname using data from Spain.
83 Descriptive Evidence
3.1 Village Characteristics
Table 2 reports the share of households within a village that have each type of family link. 22% of
couple-headed households are isolated, in that they have no extended family members resident in
the village. The incidence of not having extended family members in the same village is therefore
at least as high as the incidence of single headedness — the causes and consequences of which have
been much documented in the literature — which aﬀects 15% of households.
The remaining columns show that 16.4% of households have ties between the head of household
and that of his parents — this is around double the number of parental links from the spouse to her
parents in the village. The same inter-generational pattern occurs when we consider links from
the head and spouse to their adult children — households are around twice as likely to have at
least one son resident in the village than at least one daughter.
Intra-generational ties are more prevalent than inter-generational ties. The most likely type of
extended family tie to exist is that between brothers — 45.2% of all household heads have at least
one brother in the village. In contrast, only 23% of households have ties from the spouse to her
sister.13
3.2 The Number of Extended Family Links
Table 3 documents the number of speciﬁc family links each household has to others in the village.
These are reported for connected households, namely those households that are embedded within
an extended family network in the village and so have at least one family member resident in the
village. As we focus on couple headed households, we are able to report each type of link from
the head and spouse separately.
The ﬁrst column shows that the number of parents present outside the household and within
the village is higher for the head than for his spouse. The number of links to adult children are,
by construction, identical for head and spouse. On average, respondents have .443 sons that head
their own household in the village, and .209 daughters. In terms of sibling links, heads again have
more links to their siblings than do their spouses. In total, heads of household have blood ties to
3.34 others in the same village, and their spouse is connected to 2.54 other households. Given that
by construction links to adult sons and daughters are the same for heads and their spouses, this
implies that on average, a household is directly connected to 5.23 other households in the village.
Three further points are of note. First, Table 3 decomposes the variation in each statistic into
that between and within villages. While in most cases there is more variation within than between
villages, the proportion of the variation that is attributable to cross village diﬀerences tends to be
13A greater share of households have ties from the head of household to a spouse of another household (.285)
than from the spouse to the head (.262). This reﬂects the fact that we restrict attention to ties from couple-
headed households to both couple- and single-headed households. These ﬁgures thus highlight that single-headed
households are more likely to be female headed, as expected.
9higher for female deﬁned links than for male links. This might reﬂect the fact that there is more
sorting over locations by women in response to economic conditions, as we document throughout
our analysis.
Second, we can also use the household roster to measure family ties that are coresident. When
doing so we note that parents are signiﬁcantly more likely to reside outside of the household
than within it. On average, the head (spouse) has .06 (.02) parents resident with him (her).
In other words, there are at least ten times as many parents outside the household and within
the village, than are coresident with respondents. Given respondents’ ages, there are many more
young children coresident inside the household than adult children outside the household. Sibling
links are also many times more likely to be outside the household, which is as expected given the
age of respondents. Heads have more siblings links than their spouses, and this is again true for
links both inside and outside the household.14
Third, the evidence in Table 3 shows that the majority of extended family links are those of
male heads of household. A key source of this diﬀerence arises from women moving households
and villages at the time of marriage. To shed light on this, we exploit data on spouse’s marital
history. Wives were asked about where they went to live after marriage — 49.3% stated that they
went to live with their in-laws after marriage, and only 6.5% report living with their own parents.
The key diﬀerence between spouses with and without parents resident in the village is that 85%
of spouses that have their parents present in the village report remaining in the same village at
the time of marriage. The ﬁgure for spouses that have no parental links in the village is only 61%.
In line with the evidence from rural Indian in Rosenzweig and Stark [1989], these descriptives
hint that in rural Mexico, parents may choose to marry their daughters into distant villages as a
consumption smoothing device.
To provide external validity to the links, the Appendix presents similar information from the
Mexican Family Life Survey, that was collected in rural areas over a comparable time period.
3.3 Extended Family Networks
We now use tools from social networks analysis to describe the extended family networks as a
whole. There are 2196 family networks, covering 17,030 households that may be either single- or
couple-headed.15
Figure 3A shows there are around ﬁve to ten diﬀerent family dynasties within the same village.
Figure 3B shows the size distribution of family networks. As reported in Table 4, there are on
average 7.8 households within the same family network. Since a household is has 5.23 immediate
14In October 1998 the average age of heads (spouses) among couple headed households is 45.0 (40.5).
15To understand when two households are deﬁned to be in the same family network, consider a scenario in which
the heads of households i and j are linked because they are brothers. Household j may itself be linked to household
k, say, because the parents of the spouse of household j reside in household k. Households i and k then lie within
the same family network, even though they do not have a direct family link between them. Households i and j
are said to be of distance one from each other and households i and k are of distance two from each other. Two
households i and j are then deﬁned to be within the same family network if the distance between them, dij, is
ﬁnite.
10relatives (or distance-one relatives), as shown in Table 2, each household has two to three ties of
distance two or more in the village. About 17% of households within a given village are part of the
same family network, and Figure 3C shows the overall variation in the share of village households
that are part of the same dynasty.
Taken together, this descriptive evidence highlights that most villages have multiple family
networks. That is, it is not the case that all households become connected to all other villagers.
This is the case despite the sampled villages being of relatively small size. This ﬁnding is consistent
with papers studying endogenous networks formation. These paper consistently show that, even
within a small local economy, multiple networks arise in equilibrium [Genicot and Ray 2005,
Bramoullé and Kranton 2008, Karlan et al 2009].
Table 4 provides further information on statistics that describe the family network. The
average distance between any two households in the same network is 2.12. The degree of the
average network, deﬁned as the number of households each is directly connected to, is 2.07. This
is smaller than the average number of links each household in the sample has, as reported in Table
3, because in Table 4 there is one observation per family network and all are equally weighted
irrespective of the number of households that are embedded within the network. This highlights
that there are many family networks that comprise only two households, as shown in Figures 3B
and 4. The diameter of the network, deﬁned as the largest distance dij between any two households
i and j in the network, is around 2.5 on average. Hence family networks are unlikely to span across
more than three generations, as expected.
The table also decomposes the variation in each statistic into that between villages and that
within the same village. We note there is considerable variation arising from both dimensions of
the data. Hence there are considerable diﬀerences in the structure of family networks in diﬀerent
villages, and in the network structure of family dynasties that reside in the same village.
The ﬁnal column presents evidence on the welfare index of households within the same network.
As this is deﬁned by region, we standardize the measure within region to ease comparisons across
regions. As all households in the family network are deﬁned to be in the same village and hence
region, by construction this has mean zero. There is considerable variation in household welfare
within the same extended family network — this variation is almost as great as that across villages.
This variation rules out a strong positive assortative matching in marriage markets by family
wealth and may be potentially related to the need for establishing informal insurance arrangement
within the extended family.16,17
To emphasize howthe structure of family networks can diﬀer between villages, Figure 4 provides
a graphical representation of family networks in two villages of median size, corresponding to 36
16We can also test for assortative matching in wealth by computing the standard deviation of the poverty
index used to determine program Progresa eligibility for each family network and each village. If there is positive
(negative) assortative matching then the ratio of network over village standard deviations in poverty, sdn
sdv , should
be less (more) than one. The computed ratios are centered around one, rejecting the hypothesis of assortative
matching.
17This ﬁnding is slightly diﬀerent from the results found in Guell et al [2007] using surnames in Spain where they
document that richer Catalans have less frequent surnames.
11households. The upper panel shows a village with a relatively dispersed set of family networks.
There are ﬁve families in which there are only two households present, one large, ten-household
family network, and 16 households without family ties to any other household in the village.
In contrast the lower panel shows a very inter-connected village, with one large family network
containing 30 households, and 6 households with no relatives in the village. In the remainder of
this paper we shed light on whether and how such villages diﬀer in their family network structures
because of the underlying features of the village economy as captured by the village marginality
and inequality indices.
4 The Relationship Between Economic Characteristics and
Extended Family Networks
4.1 Village Level Analysis: Extended Family Networks
We now estimate the relationship between characteristics of the village economy on the number
and structure of family networks. To begin with, we consider how the village marginality index
in village v in region s (Mvs) and the village inequality index (Qvs) correlate with the number of
family networks in the village (Nvs). We estimate the following OLS regression at the village level,
Nvs = αs + βMvs + γQvs + δSvs + uvs, (4.1)
where αs denotes region ﬁxed eﬀects that capture diﬀerences across family networks due to the
geographic location of the village. We also condition on the size of the village (Svs) as there
is expected to be a positive correlation between village size and the number of family dynasties
present within it. We compute robust standard errors throughout. We report the estimates in
Table 5.
Column 1 shows there are a greater number of family networks in villages that — (i) are less
marginal and so better oﬀ; (ii) have greater levels of inequality, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient
for permanent income; (iii) are larger, as measured by the number of households within them, as
expected.
Columns 2 to 4 show how M and Q relate to the size of the largest family network, looking
at — (i) the absolute number of network members, (ii) the share of households in the village that
are part of the largest family network, and, (iii) the share of households that are part of any
family network. Conditional on region, — the size and the village share of the largest network
are signiﬁcantly higher the higher the village marginality (or poverty) and the higher the village
equality. Moreover, there is a signiﬁcantly greater share of households with relatives in villages
that are more equal, although this variable is has no signiﬁcant correlation to village poverty.18
18These results are qualitatively robust to using an alternative measure of inequality within the village such as
the coeﬃcient of variation or Theil index — with a wide range of sensitivity parameters — based on the household
12The results are consistent with the idea that the local economy interplays with the structure
of the extended family. More marginal villages are both poorer and more isolated from the wider
economy. Therefore its residents have a high need for insurance but a limited scope for sharing
risk with geographically distant households. In this context, it is not surprising that the local
family network is bigger. That is, in marginalized villages the beneﬁt of having a dispersed family,
which ensures the income shocks are not strongly correlated, is probably more than oﬀset by the
costs of the network being dispersed — such as increased transactions costs of enforcing cooperative
agreements within the network. In a related way, in more unequal villages — where the ability of
households to insure each other for example is greater — family networks are smaller.
The most intuitive way in which to benchmark the magnitude of the eﬀects is in terms of the
number of households in the largest network. Taking the estimates from our preferred speciﬁ-
cation in Column 2 and the descriptive evidence from Table 1 reveals that — (i) in villages with
a marginality index larger by one standard deviation, the largest family network comprises 1.45
more households; (ii) a one standard deviation decrease in the village inequality index is associated
with 1.02 more households in the largest family network; (iii) the magnitude of the eﬀect of the
marginality index (inequality index) is equivalent to 2.01 (1.41) more households in the village per
se, relative to a mean village size of 44.7 households. This emphasizes that these features of the
village economy are both qualitatively and quantitatively important correlates of the residents’
family network structures.19
Since we are comparing networks in a cross section of villages, it is impossible to identify with
complete certainty whether network structures endogenously respond to these characteristics of
the village economy, or whether the features of the local economy are themselves shaped by the
nature of extended family networks within them.20 The next subsection shows how the underlying
features of the village economy relate to the location choices of speciﬁc extended family members,
conditional on household characteristics. This helps ease concerns over the results merely reﬂecting
that households sort into villages on the basis of the characteristics of the village economy.
welfare index.
19All the results in Table 5 are qualitatively unchanged if we allowed village size to have a quadratic eﬀect
on each outcome. We have also explored whether there are non-linear eﬀects of village size using a quadratic
speciﬁcation. The evidence suggests such an eﬀect exists for all the outcomes except for the size of the largest
family network. Exploring how this varies across villages of diﬀerent size, we ﬁnd that any non-linear eﬀect is
driven predominantly by villages above the median village size (36 households). More importantly, the magnitude
of the eﬀect is quantitatively small and so is not economically signiﬁcant.
20Reltedly, one concern is that, as the extended family network data is based on information collected six months
after Progresa was implemented, the program might have caused endogenous changes in networks in those villages
that were randomly selected to receive Progresa. There is however little evidence of Progresa causing diﬀerential
migration between treatment and control locations in the ﬁrst few months of its operation, as measured by changes
in the number of households, or permanent migrants. As a check, we estimated (4.1) using data only from the
184 control villages. As expected the estimates become more precise but of the 12 coeﬃcients shown in Table 5 -
(i) none change sign in this sub-sample; (ii) of the 11 signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, 9 remain signiﬁcant at conventional
levels; (iii) the two coeﬃcients that become insigniﬁcant are on the village marginality index in Columns 2 and 3;
these are insigniﬁcant because the standard error rises in this smaller sub-sample, the point estimates are almost
unchanged (1.28 and .028 respectively); (iv) the one insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in Table 5 remains insigniﬁcant in this
sub-sample as expected.
134.2 Household Level Analysis: Extended Family Links
In order to present the evidence on the relation between the underlying village economy and the
structure of the family network we need to control for possible confounders at the household level.
This analysis sheds light on whether, conditional on household characteristics, features of
the village economy continue to have robust correlations with the structure of extended family
networks. In particular we establish the precise inter and intra-generational family links that bind
members of each network across village economies with diﬀering underlying characteristics.
To do this we deﬁne a dummy variable, Ljhvs, set equal to one if household h in village v in
region s has at least one type-j link to another household in the same village, and zero otherwise.
We can deﬁne deﬁne the following eight types of family link j — intra-generational family links,
i.e. from the head (spouse) of the household to his (her) brothers and sisters; inter-generational
family links, i.e. from the head (spouse) of a household to his (her) parents, and from the head and
spouse of the household to their adult sons and daughters. We therefore estimate the following
speciﬁcation for whether household h in village v in region s has at least one type-j link to another
household in the same village,
Ljhvs = αs + βMvs + γQvs + δSvs + λXhvs + ujhvs, (4.2)
where Xhvs are household characteristics, and all other controls are as previously deﬁned. An
econometric concern with this speciﬁcation is that the presence of a given link type-j is likely to
be inﬂuenced by the presence of other link types, j′, so that in eﬀect we need to estimate a linear
equation for each j. We therefore use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methods to estimate
these j-equations allowing for cross-equation correlation in the error terms [Zellner 1962]. The
results are reported in Table 6.21
As discussed in the introduction, a large literature has explored the mechanisms driving the
presence of extended family members. We use this to help guide our choice of which characteristics
to condition on in Xhvs. This allows us to then explore whether features of the village economy are
related to the presence of extended family members over and above such household observables.
We condition on the following controls in Xhvs, as deﬁned in the ﬁrst wave of household data
collected in October 1997. First, there is a mechanical correlation between the age of the head
and spouse and the likelihood that their parents and adult children are in close proximity so we
control for the ages of the head and spouse. To capture any ethnic diﬀerences across families, we
control for whether the head and spouse speak an indigenous language. We also condition on the
21A concern that arises with this speciﬁcation is that the dependent variable is a share and so lies between
zero and one, which is not accounted for by the SUR estimates. In relation to this we note that the mean of the
dependent variable lies well within the zero-one interval, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, we also experimented
with estimating this system of eight equations for each inter and intra-generational link using a multivariate probit
regression framework. This uses the method of simulated maximum likelihood based on the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) algorithm. The structure is therefore similar to the SUR framework except that explicit account is
taken of the binary nature of each dependent variable. We found the results to be qualitatively similar using the
two methods although the SUR estimates can be computed in considerably less time.
14number of members resident in the household.
Second, wealthier family dynasties may enjoy higher fertility and lower mortality, and so are
more likely to have extended family members present, other things equal. Wealthier families
are more likely to own land and if land markets are missing, the ability to inherit land, or to
acquire land speciﬁc human capital, may lead adult children to be more likely to remain within
the village than otherwise [Foster and Rosenzweig 2002]. We therefore control for the years of
completed schooling of the head and spouse, whether the head and spouse are working, whether
the household owns its own home, any land, any livestock, whether the house has ﬂoors of dirt,
and the household welfare index. Once this set of characteristics is controlled for, the village
marginality index captures variation due to largely exogenous factors such as the remoteness of
the village from urban centres and its level of integration into local markets.22
Table 6 reports the results. We ﬁrst focus on the results in Columns 1 to 4 on whether
households have inter-generational extended family links co-resident in the same village. We see
that in nearly all cases, such inter-generational links are more likely to be co-resident in more
marginal villages, and villages with less inequality.
The second set of results in Columns 5 to 8 focus on the presence of intra-generational links,
namely siblings, within the same village. Again in most cases, siblings are more likely to reside
in another household within the same village if the village is more marginal and more equal. As
expected, the likelihood a household has any given type of link-j is always signiﬁcantly increasing
in the size of village.
Taken together with the previous results at the village level on the network characteristics
as a whole (Table 5), the evidence points to the reason why family networks are larger in more
marginal and more equal villages, being that extended family members, that are intra and inter-
generationally linked to any given household, are more likely to reside within the same village,
all else equal. Moreover, this applies equally to the blood ties of the head as well as his spouse.
Finally, the results highlight that the structure of family networks relates to features of the village
economy as a whole, over and above the characteristics of individual households within them.23
In the ﬁnal Column, we use OLS to estimate how the local structure of the family network —
in particular the density of the network — varies with characteristics of the village economy. The
standard measure used in social networks analysis to measure local density is the local clustering
22We do not control for literacy because it is highly correlated with years of schooling — 89% (90%) of heads
(spouses) have no formal schooling if they are illiterate.
23Two further points are of note. First, the set of households in Table 6 includes both connected and isolated
households. The results are robust to restricting the sample to only those 78% of households that are embedded
within a family network. Second, although not the focus of this paper, we note that the correlations between
household characteristics and the presence of family ties have intuitive signs. For example, the mechanical corre-
lations with age are as expected with older heads and spouses being less likely to have their parents outside of the
household and resident in the village, and signiﬁcantly more likely to have their adult children in other households
in the village. Heads and spouses with more years of schooling are more likely to have their parents present. Fi-
nally, whether the head and spouse speak an indigenous language does not predict the presence of extended family
ties. This is reassuring because the number of extended family ties, for each type of tie, are no diﬀerent between
indigenous and non-indigenous households.
15coeﬃcient [Wasserman and Faust 1994]. This measures how many links from a household have
links to each other, divided by the maximum number of links they could potentially have had.
This statistic therefore lies between zero and one. For example, a local clustering coeﬃcient of
one implies all the relations of household i are directly related to each other. A local clustering
coeﬃcient of zero implies none of the family links of household i are directly related to each other.
We have constructed the local clustering coeﬃcient for all households embedded in extended family
networks and then estimated how this correlates to characteristics of the village economy. The
result in Column 9 of Table 6 shows that in poorer and more unequal villages, extended family
networks are denser, all else equal.
In conjunction with the earlier SUR regression results, this suggests that in poorer and more
unequal villages, speciﬁc familial ties are less likely to be present per se, but those that remain are
more closely related.
It is natural to interpret these results in terms of the features of the village economy that
drive extended family members to migrate away from the village. There are two key channels
we identify. First, the evidence shows that as the village becomes better oﬀ and less marginal,
extended family members are more likely to migrate to other locations. Given our measure of
marginality and the fact that we condition on household characteristics including the household
welfare index, the results imply the costs of out-migration from marginal villages is high. This
is as expected given that more marginal villages are geographically remote and less integrated
into local markets. Hence lower mobility in more marginal villages is likely to be caused by more
binding credit constraints to ﬁnance migration.24
In addition, the demand for informal insurance is likely to be greater in more marginal villages
where even small ﬂuctuations in household income can cause large falls in welfare. The demand
for extended family members to co-locate in the same village in such environments is likely to be
great given the transactions costs of implementing insurance agreements among kinship groups
are likely to be lower than with other households, all else equal.
The second channel we identify is that in more unequal villages, extended family members
are more likely to migrate away from the village, all else equal. In such economic environments,
the gains from informal risk sharing contracts increase as the income proﬁles of households diﬀer
and are subject to diﬀerent sources of risk. On the one hand, this implies family networks should
not be geographically concentrated, as they will then be more likely to be subject to common
weather related risks, and because there may exist alternatives to informal insurance agreements
with family members. On the other hand, as the geographic dispersion between network members
increases, the transactions costs of maintaining interpersonal links, monitoring the behavior of
others in the network, and providing non-monetary transfers such as labor exchange, also increase.
24That out-migration is negatively related with marginality is also consistent with the existing empirical evidence
on migration which emphasizes the household level determinants of migration. Indeed, a pattern of migration
consistent with the existence of credit constraints at the household level is documented by Angelucci [2006] using
the Progresa data. More broadly, the empirical literature has established an inverse-U shaped correlation between
the propensity to migrate and household wealth [Massey 1988, Faini and Venturini 1993, Hatton and Williamson
1998].
16Our results suggest the former eﬀect dominates overall — extended family networks become more
geographically dispersed as village inequality rises.25
The results have implications for thinking through the location choices speciﬁcally of adult
daughters and sons, which have received a lot of attention in the literature. First, they raise the
possibility that marriages of daughters are used as strategic devices to geographically diversify risk
where there is a high degree of village inequality. This is also consistent with the evidence from
rural India presented by Rosenzweig and Stark [1989]. The results also support the notion that in
more equal villages, there are fewer incentives for households to marry their daughters outside of
the village, because they are able to assortatively match in the marriage market that exists within
their own village.
The location choices of males are driven in a similar way — they are more likely to out migrate
in less marginal villages again presumably because the costs of doing so are lower. At the same
time, economic forces that tend to tie adult sons to the same location as their parents — such as
the non-tradeability of labor exchange across villages, or the nature of household production that
is tied to speciﬁc plots of land within the village — appear to be less binding when the village is
better oﬀ and more equal [Rosenzweig 1988].26
4.3 Network Level Analysis: Migration
To complement the previous results, we now directly exploit information from the October 1997
data on whether any members of the extended family network have migrated away, and whether
they have sent remittances conditional on migrating. We distinguish between permanent and
temporary migration, where the former is asked about all household members who left in the
previous 5 years the latter asks about the number of household members who left on a seasonal
basis in the year before the survey.
Migration rates are higher among household that are part of family networks: while on average
3% (19%) of households report at least one permanent (seasonal) migrant, 16% (44%) of extended
25We also checked whether extended family networks are shaped by the incidence of natural shocks to the village.
We did so using information from community surveys on the prevalence of natural shocks that aﬄicted the village
such as droughts, ﬂoods, frosts, ﬁres, pests, earthquakes, and hurricanes. We found no evidence that the incidence of
natural shocks to the village relates to the extended family structures that reside within them. This is not surprising
if individuals can anticipate the average level of such shocks in any location. Hence while the vulnerability of a
location to naturally occurring shocks may well drive the long run location choices of extended family members,
realizations of such naturally occurring shocks in the short run have little impact on the long term structure of
family networks.
26We also explored whether the features of the village economy have heterogeneous eﬀects across households on
the formation of family networks. To do so we use the classiﬁcation of households into poor and non-poor designed
to determine eligibility for Progresa transfers. This classiﬁcation is made in 1997 on the basis of the household
poverty index. We then estimate (4.2) allowing the eﬀects of Mvs and Qvs to diﬀer between those 52% of households
classiﬁed as poor, and the remaining 48% classiﬁed as non-poor. We ﬁnd no robust evidence that, conditional on
household characteristics, the features of the aggregate village economy have heterogeneous eﬀects across relatively
poor and relatively non-poor households. Hence it is not the case that the location choices of only the most or least
wealthy households within a family dynasty are aﬀected by the economic environment. Indeed, as Table 4 shows,
there remains considerable variation in the welfare index across households within the same family network in the
same village.
17family networks report at least one migrant. This is consistent with the existing literature on the
importance of networks in migration decisions [Munshi 2003].
We estimate the following function of the probability of having at least one migrant in network
n, village v and region s,
Prob(Ynvs = 1) = Φ(Mvs,Qvs,Svs, Nnvs,αs,) (4.3)
The dummy Ynvs is one if at least one member of network n has permanently (temporarily) mi-
grated away. Mvs, Qvs, and Svs denote the village marginality index, village inequality index,
and village size. Nnvs denotes characteristics that describe the network as a whole as discussed in
Section 3.2 — network size, average distance between any two households in the network, network
degree and diameter, and the average welfare index across households within the network, which
captures the migration incentives and constraints for those within the network. The region dum-
mies, αs, capture geographic diﬀerences in the propensity to migrate. We cluster the standard
errors at the village level.
Table 7 presents the marginal eﬀects estimated by probit. Column 1 shows that family networks
in more unequal villages have more permanent migrants, consistent with the earlier results. On
the other hand, there is no signiﬁcant correlation between the village marginality and permanent
migration likelihood. Column 2 explores whether at least one permanent migrant is reported to
send remittances to any household in the family network — as is intuitive, remittances are more
likely to be sent back to family networks that reside in more marginal and unequal villages, all
else equal.27 The remaining Columns repeat the analysis for seasonal migration. The seasonal
migration likelihood and the likelihood of sending remittances are unrelated to the chosen village
characteristics.
One possible interpretation of our results is that residents of unequal villages who can pool
resources with other villagers use permanent migration as part of the response to the need for
insurance against (village level) income shocks, further consistent with the evidence that these
migrants send remittances back.
As a ﬁnal point, we recognize that family networks can also change over time through fertility
choices. to explore this, the ﬁnal Column of Table 7 presents OLS estimates of fertility as a
function of characteristics of the village economy and household characteristics. We see that in
less marginal and more unequal villages, fertility rates are higher suggesting larger extended family
networks in the future.28
27This contrasts with the ﬁndings of Munshi and Rosenzweig [2005] who provide evidence from India that those
who migrate away from their sub-caste lose the services of that network, including mutual insurance arrangements.
28In this speciﬁcation we do not control for the total household size, unlike for the other speciﬁcation in Table
7. The results are robust to using a Poisson regression model that takes account of the dependent variable being a
count.
185 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper is a descriptive exploration of the relationship between the local economy - poor rural
Mexican villages - and the existence and shape of extended family networks. Using household
and community data, we ﬁnd that more marginalized and less unequal villages have larger family
networks. In these villages the permanent migration likelihood is lower.
This evidence suggests that in economic environments characterized by — (i) imperfect markets,
correlated income shocks, an absence of formal institutions of contract enforcement; and, (ii) where
all households are equally poor, households choose to or have no option but to live close to their
extended family members. The beneﬁts of having a geographically dispersed network — such as
being subject to less correlated income shocks due to climatic conditions — seem to be outweighed,
on average, by the costs of such geographic dispersion — such as increased transactions costs of
monitoring and making non-monetary transfers to others in the network, credit constraints that
prevent people from migrating, or the low marriage marketability of individuals belonging to poor
households.
This paper provides the ﬁrst large-scale description of the structure of extended family networks
in poor rural areas. We advocate incorporating questions on the extended family and other
informal institutions into household surveys. There are already some examples in small scale
village surveys, providing important insights on the role of social networks in learning about
agriculture in Ghana [Conley and Udry 2005], child fostering in Burkina Faso [Akresh 2005],
implicit insurance arrangements in Ethiopia [Dercon et al 2005], and informal borrowing in Peru
[Karlan et al 2009].
Incorporating these data into surveys will help us understand the eﬀects of the presence and
characteristics of kinship networks on household behavior and welfare, integrating insights from
anthropology and sociology [Gillin 1949, Carlos and Sellers 1972, Rothstein 1999] into mainstream
economics.
This paper is the ﬁrst step of a broader research agenda. As such, it has highlighted the
importance of understanding both how the extended family is formed and how it aﬀects the
provision of insurance and investment capital for its members. In ongoing work in Angelucci et
al [2009], we use this data at the household level to develop and test a model of insurance and
investment within family networks. The basic assumption of the model is that resource transfers
are less costly with the family network, than between unconnected households. The model and
evidence shows that connected households experience lower variability in their consumption, and
are more able to undertake investments, especially if investments are lumpy.
The results from the analysis in this paper have important implications for the design and
evaluation of policy interventions. For example, targeting the poorest villages implies targeting
mainly households that are part of an extended family. The few households with no extended
family in the village may be less likely to beneﬁt from such interventions. In scaling up a policy,
our results suggest that its eﬀects could be due to the interaction between family networks and
19the policy itself. The expected program eﬀects as the policy expands to less marginal villages
are likely to be overestimated because in those locations family networks are less dense. On the
other hand, if transfers take place within extended families, then policy responses may be muted
in the most marginal villages where any transfers are shared within the extended family. Ignoring
the latter would lead to underestimating the true policy eﬀects as the program expands to less
marginal locations.
6 Appendix
6.1 Measurement Error in Extended Family Links
There are a number of potential forms of measurement error in the surnames data that can be
checked for. The ﬁrst arises from the convention that women change their paternal surname to
their husband’s paternal surname at the time of marriage. To address this concern, we note
that the precise wording of the question speciﬁcally asks respondents to name the paternal and
maternal surname of each household member. Furthermore, in only 5.8% of households is the
spouse’s maternal surname recorded to be the same as her husband’s paternal surname. This
provides an upper bound on the extent to which measurement error of this form is occurring.
Second, if the male head is the respondent, he may not recall his wife’s maternal surname and
simply replace it with her paternal surname. This may occur because his children only inherit his
wife’s paternal surname. Reassuringly, this problem occurs in only 4.9% of households. A ﬁnal
suspicious case is households in which the paternal and maternal surnames of both the head and
spouse are all reported to be the same. This occurs for 1.6% of households, although the ﬁgure
drops to .5% if we exclude households with the most common surname in the data.
Some forms of measurement error however cannot be addressed. The ﬁrst arises from any
remaining typos in surnames. Second, there may be two identical families in the village who share
the same paternal and maternal surnames of head and spouse but are genuinely unrelated. The
matching algorithm then assigns the number of family links to be double what they actually are. A
check for the severity of this problem is based on the following intuition. By deﬁnition, household
i cannot have parental links to more than two other households (the parent’s of the head and
the parent’s of the spouse), conditional on the parents not being present within the household.
This is true for 97% of households using our matching algorithm. Third, consider a scenario in
which a women’s brother marries someone with the same maternal surname as himself. Then the
woman’s niece will be identiﬁed as her sister and although the households are within the same
family network, the strength of their tie may be inferred to be stronger than it actually is.
6.2 Sorting into Villages by Surname
Table A1 provides descriptive evidence on surnames, split according to each surname type —
the paternal and maternal surnames of the head (F1, f1) and spouse (F2, f2). For both head
20and spouse, there are fewer paternal than maternal surnames reported. There are 1696 diﬀerent
paternal surnames reported by heads (F1), lower than for the other types of surname including
those reported as the spouse’s paternal surname (F2). This partly reﬂects the patronymic naming
convention implies spouse’s paternal surnames have lower survival rates across generations than
those of male heads of household. The majority of surnames are mentioned at least twice. In the
entire sample, the most frequent paternal surname of the head covers 9% of households.
Within a village, the table shows that on average, there are 15.6 unique paternal surnames of
the head — with a standard deviation of 9.17. There is a similarly wide number of unique surnames
for the other surname types. To assess the degree of sorting by surname into village, we ﬁrst note
that the expected number of households in the sample with the same head’s paternal surname
is 13.3.29 The next row reports the same information but at the village level. The fact that the
expected number of households in the village with the same surname is signiﬁcantly smaller than
in the population implies households do not perfectly sort into villages by surname.30
6.3 External Validity of the Extended Family Links: MxFLS Data
To provide external validity to the constructed data on extended family links in the Progresa data,
we present similar information from an alternative data set that was collected in a comparable
economic environment and time period. The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), collected in
2001, provides information on the number of each type of link, by head and spouse, that are still
alive in any location, not just the same village. This data set therefore provides an upper bound
on what should be recorded as family links in the Progresa data, in which we only construct links
in the same village. In addition, we exploit information from the household roster in the MxFLS
to also construct the number of family links inside the household, by each type of family link,
and for the head of household and his spouse separately. To make the MxFLS data comparable,
we restrict the sample to couple headed households that reside in locations with less than 2500
inhabitants in states that are also covered in the Progresa data. There are 580 such households.31
Table A2 reports the ﬁndings from the MxFLS. The number of family links to parents, children
and siblings outside the household and located anywhere, are greater than those we construct
using surnames data within the village from the Progresa data. The fact that more parents of the
29These population values are calculated as follows for any given surname type. Let ni denote the number of
households with surname i and let N denote the number of households that report some surname of the given type.




. The value reported in Table
A1 is the averages of Ei over all surnames i.
30These village values are calculated as follows for any given surname type. Let niv denote the number of
households with surname i in village v and nv denotes the number of households that report some surname of the
type in village v. The expected number of households in the village with name i is eiv = niv.(nv−1
nv ). The values
reported in Table 1 are the weighted average of eiv over all villages v, where the weights are niv
nv . These weights
take account of the fact that the same name may be reported to diﬀerent extents in diﬀerent villages.
31As discussed earlier, one restriction on the matching algorithm used in the Progresa data is that we are unable
to identify links to parental households if only one of the parents is alive. To ensure the MxFLS data is therefore
comparable, we do not include information from couple headed households that report only having a single parent
alive in another household. There are no such concerns for parental links deﬁned inside the household.
21spouse are alive is likely to be driven by spouses being younger than their husbands. Moreover, the
diﬀerences between husbands and spouses in the number of parents and siblings are less dramatic
in the MxFLS data, presumably because these statistics refer to family links in any location and
so are unaﬀected by the geographic mobility of women at the time of marriage.
The comparison of family links within the household is also informative. Here the number of
each type of family is similar to that found in Progresa, although the number of children is slightly
lower. This may be driven by diﬀerences in the age of respondents in the two data sets — the age of
spouses is 40.5 (43.5) in the Progresa (MxFLS) data. Heads and spouses are also more educated
in the MxFLS data — the mean years of schooling for heads (spouses) in MxFLS is 3.91 (3.46)
in comparison to 2.77 (2.27) in Progresa. These diﬀerences would explain the lower numbers of
children in the household in the MxFLS data if more educated couples have lower fertility rates.32
Moreover, it remains the case that in the MxFLS data as in Progresa, the number of family links
of the head inside the household are greater than those of the spouse.
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26Notes: There is one observation for each of the 504 villages The village marginality index is constructed from information on the share of illiterate
Table 1: The Village Economy
Mean, standard deviation in parentheses





efficient of household's 




Minimum Value -1.97 6 2.97
Maximum Value 2.97 222 15.8
Notes: There is one observation for each of the 504 villages. The village marginality index is constructed from information on the share of illiterate
adults in the village, the share of dwellings without water, drainage systems, electricity, and with floors of dirt, the average number of occupants per
room in village households, the share of the population working in the primary sector, distances from other villages, and health and school
infrastructures located in the village. A higher marginality index corresponds to the village being more marginal (poorer). The household welfare index
is a weighted average of household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical
characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than current income. An
increase in the index implies the households is less poor. The measure of village inequality is the Gini coefficient of the welfare index of all households
in the village. This is scaled to lie between 0 and 100. Village size is defined as the number of households in the village. The village marginality index is
standardized across all villages. The villages in the sample cover 7 regions.0
a-generational Family Links
l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: The Share of Households With Extended Family Links in the Village, by Type of Link
Mean, standard deviation in parentheses





















Spouse to Spouse 
(Sisters)
Fraction of households
village with such a fam
 in the  .781 .164 .085 .178 .087 .452 .285 .262 .230
ily link (.156) (.100) (.067) (.108) (.068) (.186) (.173) (.150) (.164)
Minim m Val e Minimum Va ue 16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Value 1 .621 .318 .600 .417 .939 .872 .939 .939
Notes: There is one observation for each of the 504 villages. The sample is based on couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves.xtended  Total Links From  l
Table 3: The Number of Extended Family Links of Households, by Type of Link
Connected Households
Means, standard deviation between villages in parentheses, standard deviation within villages in brackets
Parents Adu t Children Siblings All E
Fa
Father and Mother Sons Daughters Brothers Sisters
mily Links Household
From head of household to: .461 1.39 .840 3.34
(.094) .443 .209 (.340) (.325) (1.02) 5.23
[.837] (.399) (1.95) [1.87] [1.52] [3.92] (1.53)
From spouse of household to: .250 [1.44] [.813] .910 .725 2.54 [5.47]
(.260) (1.23) (.304) (1.04)
[.656] [1.71] [1.51] [3.89]
Notes: There is one observation per household. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves that have at least one
extended family member present in the village. An adult child defined is to be at least 17 years old. By construction, the number of links to adult sons and daughters is the same from the
head and spouse. The total links from the household is the sum of unique extended family links from the household to others in the same village, and does not therefore double count the
children of the head and spouse of the household. The decomposition of the standard deviation into that between and within villages takes account of the fact that the number of
households differs in each village.Notes: There is one observation per family network so that each network has the same weight irrespective of the number of households within it. The underlying
sample of households is based on couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Of the baseline sample of 22553 couple
Table 4: Extended Family Network Descriptives






Average Distance Degree Diameter
Standardized Household 
Welfare Index
Mean 7.76 .167 2.12 2.07 2.45 -.001
SD between villages (9.65) (.149) (.303) (1.20) (1.18) (.566)
SD within villages [11.3] [.153] [.545] [1.19] [2.11] [.521]
Notes: There is one observation per family network so that each network has the same weight irrespective of the number of households within it. The underlying
sample of households is based on couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Of the baseline sample of 22553 couple
headed households, 17030 (75.5%) of them are within family networks with at least two households. There are 2196 family networks in total. The size of the network is
the number of households in the network. Two households that are directly connected are defined to be of distance one to each other. The average distancei st h e
average over all possible pairs of households within the family network. The diameter of the networks is the longest distance between two households that exists in the
network. The household welfare index is a weighted average of household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and
other physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than current income. The
index is calculated relative to a state norm. Hence we standardize the index within each state. An increase in the index implies the households is less poor. The
decomposition of the standard deviation into that between and within villages takes account of the fact that the number of family networks differs in each village.Table 5: Family Network Structures and the Village Economy












e of Households in the 
rgest Family Network
Share of Households 
that are Connected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Village marginality index    -.374***   1.46**   .027** -.007
(.117) (.665) (.011) (.007)
Village inequality index   .145**   -.558**   -.017**   -.010**
(.059) (.283) (.007) (.004)
Village size    .034***    .722***    .003***    .001***
(.007) (.050) (.000) (.000)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared Adjusted R squared .189 .189 .749 .749 .154 .125 .154 .125
Observations (village level) 504 504 504 504
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. There is one observation for each village, and each dependent variable is constructed using
couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves in each village. The village marginality index is constructed from
information on the share of illiterate adults in the village, the share of dwellings without water, drainage systems, electricity, and with floors of dirt, the average
number of occupants per room in village households, the share of the population working in the primary sector, distances from other villages, and health and
school infrastructures located in the village. A higher marginality index corresponds to the village being more marginal (poorer). The household welfare index is
a weighted average of household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical characteristics of
the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than current income. An increase in the index
implies the households is less poor. The measure of village inequality is the Gini coefficient of the welfare index of all households in the village. This is scaled
to lie between 0 and 100. Village size is defined as the number of households in the village. The village marginality index is standardized across all villages.
The villages in the sample cover 7 regions. Of the baseline sample of 22553 couple headed households, 17030 (75.5%) of them are within family networks
with at least two households. There are 2196 family networks in total. Robust standard errors are reported.e Village
Table 6: Extended Family Links and the Village Economy
Columns 1-8: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates
Links to Other Households in the Sam
Inter-generational Family Links Intra Network 
Characteristic
-generational Family Links

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Village marginality index .001   .006**    .017***    .018*** .004    .017***    .021***    .018***   -.024**
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.010)
Village inequality index    -.005***    -.004***    -.009***    -.004***    -.021***    -.018***    -.014***    -.017***    .014***
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.005)
Village size/100    .022***    .046***    .074***    .063***    .133*** 9    .1 0***    .178***    .171***    -.183***
(.007) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.028)
Household controls Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations (household level) 18979 15358
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The village marginality index is constructed from information on the share of illiterate adults in the village, the share of dwellings without water,
drainage systems, electricity, and with floors of dirt, the average number of occupants per room in village households, the share of the population working in the primary sector, distances from other villages,
and health and school infrastructures located in the village. A higher marginality index corresponds to the village being more marginal (poorer). The household welfare index is a weighted average of
household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to
correlates of permanent income rather than current income. An increase in the index implies the households is less poor. The measure of village inequality is the Gini coefficient of the welfare index of all
households in the village. This is scaled to lie between 0 and 100. Village size is defined as the number of households in the village. The village marginality index is standardized across all villages. The
villages in the sample cover 7 regions. The following household level characteristics are also controlled for - the husband's age, years of schooling, whether he speaks an indigenous language, and whether
has is currently working, the spouse's age, years of schooling, whether she speaks an indigenous language, and whether she is currently working, the household welfare index, the number of members of the
household, whether the household owns its home, own land, has dirt floors, and has any livestock. In the SUR specification, the Breusch-Pagan test of independence rejects the null hypothesis that the error
terms are uncorrelated in each regression at the 1% significance level. In Column 9 the dependent variable is the local clustering coefficient of the household, and the sample is restricted to households that
are embedded in a family network. The specification is estimated using OLS and robust standard errors clustered by village are calculated.(5) (4)
Table 7: Migration and the Village Economy
Columns 1- 4: Probit Estimates, Marginal Effects Reported
Column 5: OLS Estimates
Robust Standard Errors Reported, Clustered by Village
Permanent Migration S Fertility easonal Migration
Dependent Variable:
Any member perma
five years prior to O












Number of children 
aged less than 16 in 
the household
(1) (2) (3)
Village marginality index .015   .017** .008 .000    -.220***
(.010) (.007) (.020) (.019) (.035)
Village inequality index    .016***    .011*** -.014 -.011    .077***
(.005) (.004) (.009) (.009) (.014)
Village size/100 -.000 .000 .001 .000 .052
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.072)
Mean of dependent vari p able .157 .106 .444 .394 2.72
Network controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (network level) 2196 2196 2196 2196
Observations (househol evel) d l 18979
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Columns 1 to 4 the unit of analysis the extended family network. In Column 5 the unit of analysis is the household. Robust standard errors are
reported allowing for clustering at the village level. The village marginality index is constructed from information on the share of illiterate adults in the village, the share of dwellings without water, drainage
systems, electricity, and with floors of dirt, the average number of occupants per room in village households, the share of the population working in the primary sector, distances from other villages, and health
and school infrastructures located in the village. A higher marginality index corresponds to the village being more marginal (poorer). The household welfare index is a weighted average of household income
(excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent
income rather than current income. An increase in the index implies the households is less poor. The measure of village inequality is the Gini coefficient of the welfare index of all households in the village. This is
scaled to lie between 0 and 100. Village size is defined as the number of households in the village. The village marginality index is standardized across all villages. The villages in the sample cover 7 regions.
The following network level characteristics are also controlled for - the size of the network, the average distance between any two households in the network, the degree of the network, the diameter of the
network, and the average welfare index across households within the network. In Column 5 the dependent variable is the number of children aged 16 or less resident in the baseline. In this specification we do
not control for the total household size.Table A1: Descriptive Statistics on Surnames, by Surname Type
Mean, standard errors in parentheses, percentages in brackets
Head's Paternal Surname Head's Maternal Surname Spouse's Paternal Surname Spouse's Maternal Surname
(F1) (f1) (F2) (f2)
Number of surnames 1696 1996 1912 2025
Number [percentage] of surnames mentioned more than once 1064 [62.7] 1188 [59.5] 1088 [56.9] 1100 [54.3]
Number of unique names in the village 15.6 20.1 19.5 20.9
Expected number of same surname matches in population 13.3 11.2 9.92 9.26
(1.66) (1.36) (1.25) (1.19)
Expected number of same surname matches in the village 7.55 5.31 5.42 4.98
(.039) (.036) (.036) (.040)
Notes: For the matching probabilities and expected number of same surname matches in the population, the standard errors are clustered by surname for each surname type. The sample is restricted to those households that
can be tracked for the first and third waves of the Progresa data, namely in the baseline survey in October 1997 (wave 1) and the first post program survey in October 1998 (wave 3). There are 22553 such households.A d 0
Table A2: The Number of Family Links, by Type of, as Reported in the Mexican Family Life Survey
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard error in parentheses clustered by village
Outside of the Household (ANY location)
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
From head of household to: .476 - 1.23 3.27 4.97
(.035) (.089) (.116) (.014)
From spouse of household to: .669 - 1.23 3.50 5.39
(.039) (.089) (.113) (.148)
Inside of the Household
Pt Pa C rent Child A d 0 16 hildren  ge   -16 Ad lt Child Adult Childre Sibli All n Siblings All
From head of household to: .047 2.02 .571 .019 2.66
(.009) (.079) (.039) (.007) (.084)
From spouse of household to: .002 2.02 .571 .009 2.60
(.002) (.079) (.039) (.005) (.082)
Notes: The sample is taken from the first wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey, 2001. Standard errors are clustered by village. We restrict this sample to the seven Mexican states that are also covered in
the Progresa evaluation data, and to couple headed households, in locations with less than 2500 inhabitants. There are 580 such households. By construction, the number of family links to parental
households is always conditional on two such family links existing. We do not therefore use information on households that have single parents in any location. By construction, the number of children of the
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Figure 1: The Village Economy
A: Village Marginality and Inequality
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Notes: In each figure, there is one observation at the village level. The village marginality index is constructed from information on the share of
illiterate adults in the village, the share of dwellings without water, drainage systems, electricity, and with floors of dirt, the average number of
occupants per room in village households, the share of the population working in the primary sector, distances from other villages, and health and
school infrastructures located in the village. A higher marginality index corresponds to the village being more marginal (poorer). The household
welfare index is a weighted average of household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other
physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than
current income. An increase in the index implies the households is less poor. The measure of village inequality is the Gini coefficient of the welfare
index of all households in the village. This is scaled to lie between 0 and 100. Village size is defined as the number of households in the village.






































































Figure 2: Family Tree
Notes: We use the convention that the head's surnames are written in standard (black) font, and those of his wife are written in (red) italics. Paternal
surnames are indicated in upper case (F1, F2) and maternal surnames are indicated in lower case (f1, f2). First names are not shown as they are not


































































































Figure 3: Family Network Descriptives
A. Number of Family Networks in the Village
B. Size Distribution of Family Networks
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Notes: Each figure is constructed from those family networks with at least two households in them. Of the baseline sample of 22553 households
that can be tracked over the first and third waves of Progresa, 17030 (75.5%) of them are within family networks with at least two households.
These can be single or couple headed households. There are 2196 family networks in total.Figure 4: Family Network Graphs, at Median Village Size
A. Disperse Village
B. Interconnected Village
Notes: The two villages shown in Figures A and B have the same number of households in them. The number of households in each is 36, which
is the median village size in the Progresa data. Each node represents a household. Each link between households correspond either to a
parent/child link, a child/parent link, or a sibling link. Single node households that are not linked to any other households are shown in the top left
hand corner of each graph. The figures are generated using UCINET.